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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: This paper is based on the models derived by the researchers to explain the patterns of 
corporate governance, firms’ financial policies and liquidity position.  
Methodology: A deductive approach has been adopted to reconcile and examine the different 
models of corporate governance and firms’ financial policies. 
Findings: The study showed that corporate savings is a good predictor of the macro level 
investment in a country. The magnitude of national investment will increase by improvement in 
corporate savings. In fact the corporate savings indicate the expansion in business activities 
which may be an indicator of the trust and confidence of private sector. On the other hand it 
explains the financial health of corporate sector, which may provide the significant portion of tax 
revenue to the government for developing projects in public sector. The study has concluded that 
corporate governance is a significant variable in determining the liquidity and circularity debts. 
In this way corporate governance becomes a crucial determinant of the national investment. 
Implications: The bad corporate governance may deteriorate the investment activities at national 
level, which may damage the economy for a longer term. This study also indicates capital 
structure and pattern of ownership play important role in the determination of corporate 
governance of an institution. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic governance is a theoretical concept that covers issues in many pastures. It includes 
economic development and growth, organizational behavior, political economy and the like. 
Williamson (2005) explains the economic governance as the “study of good order and workable 
arrangements”. It studies processes which support economic transactions and different activities. 
These processes are followed within formal and informal institutions. The formal and informal 
institutions in a country progress to undertake different economic activities. Problem arises when 
informal activities are found within the formal system of organizations. These informalities may 
be found in any formal system i.e. political system, financial system, economic system and the 
like. At times, organizations may be involved in these informal economic activities. They may 
take undue benefits of concentrated ownership, poor protection of shareholders in minority and 
accepting projects which may destroy the wealth of shareholders. These activities are termed as a 
problem of corporate governance. Economic governance studies the institutions and 
organizations while corporate governance deals with internal management of a corporation 
(Dixit, 2008).  
Vitols (1995) compared the New Institutional Economies (NEIs) perspective and economic 
governance perspective. The study found that later perspective focuses on macro level. This 
paper takes up economic governance perspective to support the argument that it can lead to 
higher amount of macro level investment in a country. For this purpose, corporate governance is 
taken as one of the offshoots of the economic governance. 
In the neoclassical approach, high rate of investment is directly linked with high rate of savings. 
In the non-neoclassical approach, savings are not automatically translated into investment but 
have a causal relationship. According to this approach, profits are the outcome of investments. 
This paper takes the non- neoclassical approach where savings and investment are not directly 
linked but there are some reasons behind them.   
The aim of this paper has many folds. First, it attempts to investigate the corporate governance 
practices being followed in the public listed firms in Pakistan. Some big families in Pakistan 
have more than one business. Transfer of one CEO to another company is a common practice 
which hinders the corporate governance practices. Similarly, compensation of CEOs is also 
biased due to relationship based corporate governance structure. Salaries and other requisites are 
not performance based, rather determined either on political or relation grounds. Managerial 
remuneration to capital is taken as the proxy of corporate governance. 
Secondly, the study aims to examine the issue of liquidity problem exists in the form of 
circularity debt mainly in the energy sector of Pakistan in relation to corporate governance. It is 
an attempt to explain not only the factors contributing good corporate governance but also to 
seek an understanding of its relationship with circularity debt with respect to liquidity crisis. The 
study has a fundamental premise that bad corporate governance is responsible for circularity debt 
and liquidity crisis. Pakistan has been facing this phenomenon for almost one decade. There were 
several solutions given but no one was long run. This study is an endeavor to recommend a long 
lasting as well as beneficial solution for both the government as well as all stakeholders. 
Circularity debt shows illiquidity of firms which results when one party holds the payment of 
other party in the supply chain. This not only hurts the operation of the company but country also 
  
faces losses in terms of GDP. It is hypothesized that circularity debt issue arose because of bad 
corporate governance practices being implemented in Pakistan along with some other 
explanatory variables.  
It also intends to explore the causes based on which firms decide to retain their earnings and 
increase the equity. The decision of retained earnings epitomizes the financing policy of the 
company. Firms having good future investment opportunities retain a large portion of earnings 
after tax. According to pecking order theory, firms always put retained earnings as first priority 
whenever fund is needed. This phenomenon is examined with liquidity and earnings of the 
company as explanatory variables.  
Finally, the paper recommends a path way to a developing country to progress by increasing the 
corporate savings. It is revealed that investment in the country depends on corporate savings. 
These objectives are interlinked with each other with separate propositions. Dependent variable 
in the first proposition becomes explanatory variable in the second proposition. Similarly, 
dependent variable in the second proposition takes the position of independent variable in the 
third proposition and so on till the forth proposition. Based on a combination of endogenous as 
well as exogenous variables, the paper finally argues that corporate savings are a good indicator 
to macro level investment of the country. 
 
2. Circularity Debt 
The study intends to elucidate that good corporate governance can diminish the issue of 
circularity debt exist in Pakistan. Circularity debt arises when one entity faces problems in its 
cash inflows and consequently fails to discharge its obligations. Similarly, second entity does not 
receive its payments; it further withholds the disbursement to other entity. As a result, this 
perturbs all segments of the payment chain. This warm and unresolved issue persists mainly in 
the power sector of Pakistan as well as some other government owned firms like Pakistan 
International Airline, Pakistan Steel Mills and Pakistan Railways. The amount of reported 
circularity debt is the sum of the receivables of each organization. Payable of one organization 
becomes receivable for another organization. When subtract one from the other, these should be 
canceled out or the difference should be smaller in number. In case of power sector in Pakistan, 
this amount was estimated to be Rs.537 billion as on June 30, 2011 and Rs.872 billion as on June 
30, 2012, account for roughly 4% of the nation GDP (Planning Commission of Pakistan, 2013). 
To comprehend these issues, it is imperative to look at the key organizations which involve in 
the supply chain. 
 
2.1 Supply Chain of the Circularity Debt in the Energy Sector of Pakistan 
2.1.1 The suppliers of primary energy 
This segment of the chain provides energy to power generation companies. The chain begins 
from the exploration of oil and gas. These include companies like OGDCL and PPL. These 
companies transfer oil/gas to oil refineries companies which are ARL and PARCO. Accordingly, 
oil refineries supply to distribution companies. They supply gas distribution companies like 
SNGPL and SSGC and oil distributing companies like PSO and Shell.  
 
2.1.2 The Power Generation Companies 
The second step in the chain starts when exploration companies supply energy to this segment. 
The companies which are involved in power generations are KESC, IPPs, CPPA, WAPDA and 
  
PEPCO. The core entity in the energy sector is PEPCO which is an umbrella institution engaged 
in managing power generation companies (GENCOs), the National Transmission and Dispatch 
Companies (NTDC) and power distribution companies (DISCOs). 
 
2.1.3 The Power Distribution Companies 
This segment obtains energy from the generation companies and distribute to individuals, 
industrial consumers, Government, FATA, etc. These comprise companies like LESCO, 
HESCO, IESCO, MEPCO, FESCO, PESCO, QESCO and GEPCO and are collectively called 
DISCOs. 
PEPCO is an umbrella company which is responsible to collect tariffs from its customers and 
Government as well and disburse to its suppliers like IPPs, OMC and gas companies. Cash 
inflows and outflows must be logically comparable in order to function the business smoothly. 
Cash outflows of the PEPCO are sure because these are obligation which has to be fulfilled. 
Cash inflows are uncertain because of absence or delay in tariffs payments. Sometimes 
government delays in subsidies while on the other hand, some powerful individual and 
government institutions withhold their payment. Ultimately this accumulates the receivable 
amount in the PEPCO account which results delay in payment to its suppliers which in turn seize 
payment to top of the segment. This imbalance of cash flows is one of the reasons of circularity 
debt. Table 1 shows the receivables from all distribution companies, called DISCOs from 2008-
09 to 2011-12 alongwith their share in the total receivables. 
This is evidenced in the table 1 that poor revenue collection by PEPCO from DISCOs is one of 
the causes of circularity debt. This problem is not identical in the country as some of the DISCOs 
have good track record. One of the reasons which contribute to the hike in receivables is the lack 
of accountability of DISCOs. High political interference, low transparency and failure of 
accountability do play a significant role, showing corporate governance issue which must be 
addressed. 
It is reality that there are a bulk amount of receivables in the books of PEPCO from DISCOs but 
on the other hand, DISCOs also have a huge amount of receivable from different provinces of 
Pakistan. Table 2 gives the fact of these receivables. In fact, receivables gradually increased from 
2005 to 2012. Balochistan is the top of the list which has to pay highest amount in the year of 
2012. 
The study implies that good corporate governance can improve the management of liquid assets 
(working capital). Table 3 shows some highlights of the receivables and payables of public 
corporation in Pakistan for 2010 and 2011. It can easily be comprehended that receivables are 
greater than payables which implies that circularity debt is the governance issue which can be 
overcome through good governance. 
Circularity Debt is taken as a proxy of liquidity. It takes the value of 1 if the firm faces the 
problem of circularity debt and zero otherwise. 
It is hypothesized that circularity debt arises because of poor corporate governance. Zheka 
(2007) suggested positive relationship between improved liquidity position and good corporate 
governance practices. García-Teruel, Pedro and Juan (2009) found inverse relation between 
accounting accruals quality and the cash level by firms. 
 
 
 
  
3. Corporate Saving Decisions 
 
One of the components of national savings is the corporate savings which account for a large 
portion of it. China’s corporate savings as of GDP in 2003 was 18% or US$700 billion (China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics). China is not the only country with higher corporate savings but 
other countries like India, Australia and the UK are also on the same line. J.P.Morgan (2005) and 
IMF (2005) observed that companies in G-7 economies have presented an increase in 
undistributed profit. Literature of corporate finance does not believe high corporate savings as 
inefficiency or corporate mis-governance. It could be a result of increasing working capital needs 
faced by corporations. Fama & French, (2001) studied a pattern of not paying dividend in the 
U.S. from 1978 to 1999.     
The ultimate objective of a corporation is to maximize shareholder’s wealth. The share price 
carries future information about companies’ affairs and business decisions. If share price rises in 
spite of the low dividend announcement, it is evidenced that the firm has good investment 
opportunities not only from company’s perspective but also in the eyes of investors. Ultimately, 
shareholders will get benefit from this retained earnings in the future. Modigliani & Miller 
(1958) suggest that only the required return is relevant from investors’ point of view. If it is 
fulfilled, dividend becomes irrelevant. 
The issue of retained earnings may be viewed either from the macroeconomic perspective or in 
connection with corporate finance. Economic standpoint of the subject is interested to examine 
the cyclical fluctuation of the economy. While corporate finance studies the matter with a view 
to the rights and interests of owners and managers of a corporation. 
This paper has a strong proposition that corporate savings are a good indicator of macro level 
investment in a country. By having this proposition, it intends to merge the economic theory with 
the corporate finance.  The effect of retained earnings on the total investment in the country 
depends upon the investment in different type of assets by the company, decisions of capital 
structure, liquidity position of the firm, positive cash flow from operations, profitability and 
corporate governance practices within the firm. Good corporate governance lead the firm to 
better liquidity management, which in turn, let the firm to retain some earnings and invest in the 
profitable and positive NPV projects. This will increase the total investment in the country. 
There are favorable as well as unfavorable arguments of the corporate savings. Advocates of 
retained earnings assert that it facilitates corporations to accumulate the cash surplus during the 
business growth which, in turn, strengthen the firm to resist the adverse effect during the time of 
business failures. While challengers of the subject argue that cyclical fluctuations is intensified 
by this decisions. Furthermore, they also reiterate that reinvestment of corporate earnings is easy 
to misallocate of resources. Having for and against arguments, the decisions of retained earnings 
have the following key benefits which are hard to ignore. 
 
1. Accumulation of cash in good times and uses them in bad times. 
2. In contrast to external equity, the retained corporate profit reduces the issue cost and 
losses because of under-pricing (Chandra, 2002).  
3. Retention of earnings is likely to increase new investment in the economy (Dobrovolsky, 
1945). 
  
4. Reinvestment of corporate savings does not have same pressure from stockholders to earn 
the required return as compare to funds obtain from the capital market. (Dobrovolsky, 
1945). 
5. There are no transactions as well as bankruptcy costs involved with retained earnings 
(Altman, 1993). 
 
Weidenhammer (1933) discussed the eminent role of corporate savings in the capital formation 
in the England and Germany. He argued that investment through retained earnings adds high 
sub-marginal returns than the funds generated through capital market. It was suggested that 
increased percentage of retained earnings with respect to capital formation lead to high 
fluctuations in interest rate in the capital market. The study mainly focused on the faulty 
investment of retained earnings and pointed out separation of ownership & control and 
management as two major factors behind it. 
Myers & Majluf (1984) also talked of the importance of retained earnings of companies in 
connection with not only at macro but also at the micro level. They pointed out that corporate 
savings are the best source of financing in terms of risk and costs.  
Shanta (1982) investigated the importance of corporate sector in the domestic savings in India. 
The study found a decline trend in the corporate savings during 1975-76 to 1978-79, indicating a 
small share in the overall economy of the India. Bhole & Jitendra (2005) studied the 
determinants of retained earnings in India while taking the data from 1966 through 2000. They 
advocated that high rate of economic growth with stability may be achieved if corporate savings 
rate become high as well. Significant determinants of retained earnings in this study were profit 
after tax, availability of external funds, investment opportunities, cost of borrowing and cost of 
equity. 
The debate of allocating corporate profit between dividend and retained earnings dates back to 
the study of Lintner (1956) which argues to drive behavioral relationships of dividend and to 
treat retained earnings as residual. Turnovsky (1967) provided a counter argument against the 
present studies that retained earnings may be a residual but are still governed by some behavioral 
relationship. He estimated dividend equation as well as gross retained earnings equations and 
found that firms strive to find their dividend more urgent but the result is not statistically 
significant. Secondly, last year gross profit in the retained earnings equation is significantly 
negative while positive in the current year level, indicating that it changes the profits and current 
level which ultimately determines as how much should be retained by the corporations. Thirdly, 
retained earnings are determined by the transitory components of profits. Furthermore, the study 
also revealed that retained earnings are determined by the current profit which is opposite of 
dividend decisions. As far as the decision of investment is concerned, no statistically significant 
result was found, implying that investments play a minor role in determining the retained 
earnings. 
The decision of retained earnings reflects the capital structure policy of firms. This internal 
financing ratio during 1970-1985, was 100% in the non-financial firms of the UK. In the US, this 
ratio was 85% while around 60% in Japan. Firm in Pakistan showed 58.3% in the same period 
(D’Souza, 2000). Firms with high amount of circularity debt tend to hold high percentage of 
earnings to efficiently run the business operations. Table 4 illustrates the percentages of internal 
financing ratio of top 50 manufacturing companies in different countries. 
 
  
4. Investment in Pakistan 
 
The flows of foreign direct investment as well as domestic investments in GDP remain slow 
during 1990s and 2000s. Even the share of domestic investment in GDP was continuously 
declining. Most of the time it is argued that investment in a country also depends on FDI and 
other remittances. Table 4 shows some facts of the history of investment in Pakistan as 
percentage of GDP either in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) or domestic investment 
(GFCF). 
Examination of the table 5 reveals that there is no relationship between the two economic 
variables. If one increases another decreases. Reading the table from top to down, we come to 
know that FDI as percentage of GDP increased from 0.61 to 1.03 from the year 1990-91 to 2007-
08. GFCF as percentage of GDP, in the same number of years, decreased from 17.30 to 15.55. 
Besides, each variables show opposite directions every time during the time span of 1990-91 to 
2007-08. For instance, in the year 1990-91 the FDI as of GDP was 0.61 while GFCF as of GDP 
was 17.30. In the next year 1991-92, FDI decreased to 0.57 but the GFCF increased to  
17.47. Similarly, in the 1994-95 FDI as of GDP was 0.81 and GFCF as of GDP was 17.97. In the 
next year 1995-96, the FDI as of GDP increased to 1.19 while GFCF as of GDP declined to 
17.03.  Mean values are far from each other, showing for FDI 0.9533 while for GFCF is 16.3783. 
Moreover, there is negative insignificant statistical correlation between the two, showing -0.261 
insignificant correlation.  
1990s was the starting ear where government of Pakistan, with some exceptions, allowed the 
same rules to foreign investors as being applied to domestic investors. In the 2000s, investment 
policy was based on the principles of privatization, liberal remittances and the like by the 
government of Pakistan. 
Figure 1 also strong our understanding about no relationship between FDI and GFCF as 
percentage of GDP. The magnitude of both of the variables is far from each other. In most of the 
time, both variables went on opposite directions. 
It gives little evidence that investment in Pakistan is not dependent only upon the FDI but other 
sources are also having importance. Out of these other important sources, corporate savings are 
the main source of investment in Pakistan or elsewhere. 
 
5. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) 
 
Formerly known as gross domestic investment, covers the investment in fixed assets of the 
economy as well as net changes in the inventory level. Fixed assets comprise plant, machinery, 
land improvement, equipment, and construction of road, railways, schools, hospitals, and private 
as well as commercial buildings. Inventories include stocks of goods taken by firms to meet day 
to day fluctuations in sales, production or work in progress.  
Empirically, society, as a whole, does not take quick benefit out of it but contribute in making 
goods as discussed above to largely increase the efficacy of productive endeavor. It is confirmed, 
through the economic theory and experience that the differences in the economic development as 
well as growth are intertwined with the differences in the composition level of capital stock. This 
capital stock is buildup by the capital formation accumulation. 
Thus, economists have been using the estimation of capital formation and capital stock to 
analyze the results of productive activity. As compared to developed countries, developing 
  
countries like Pakistan have shortage of capital and natural resources. Therefore, the central 
problem in these countries is the accumulation of capital formation. The thesis is aimed at 
confirming the dependency of GFCF on corporate savings. 
All of these stated investments in the country are made either by state-owned or private-owned 
firms. An increase in retained earnings by firms can boost the capital investment in the country. 
Figure 2 depicts the history of GFCF in Pakistan over the period of 1960 to 2011. Increase in the 
investment in GFCF started somewhere in 1982 and reached at its peak in the year 2011. 
Consistent increase shows the interest of government in this respect as shown in table 4, almost 
58% of the investment in Pakistan came from internal financing. 
 
6. Propositions 
 
6.1 Proposition 1 
 Firm specific factors explain corporate governance practices.  
Firm specific factors include type of the organization (ORGTYP), ownership concentration 
(OWNCONCT), log of capital (LOGCAP) and distribution of Assets (CAFA). 
 CAFALOGCAPOWNCONCTORGTYPCG 43210        [1] 
Where  is the parameter 
This proposition leads to the following corollaries. 
6.1.1 Corollary 1 
Public sector ownership of a firm affects the pattern of institutional governance. 
The corollary (1) explains that firm specific variables- type of organization determine the 
governance practices. The governance practices may differ in the fully private organization from 
the public sector organization. 
The institutional settings of government and privately owned firms are different. Governance is 
weaker in government-owned corporations as compared to privately-owned firms. Salary and 
other perquisites of CEOs in government corporations are higher as compared to the IPPs in 
private sector due to political influence in public sector.  
 
6.1.2 Corollary 2 
Ownership concentration distorts the corporate governance practices.  
The higher concentration of ownership may derail the goal of value maximization of a firm. The 
value of a firm has a direct relation with the wealth of shareholders. The role of directors in 
highly concentrated firms may force the management to pay personal expenses of directors in 
indirect ways. The entertainment cost, travelling, special benefits and cost of living allowances 
may be included in these personal expenses. It is the additional agency cost paid by the highly 
concentrated firms. It is obvious that directors may save their personal income by shifting the 
personal expenditures in firms’ accounts. The personal savings of the directors increase their 
personal wealth and this practice may create a dichotomous between the directors and 
shareholders’ objectives. The probability of such practices is higher in small firms as compared 
  
to the large firms. In global comparison and categorization of companies in Pakistan, the 
majority of companies in the energy sector is classified as small firms. 
 
6.1.3 Corollary 3 
The combination of debt and equity plays a pivotal role in determining the governance practices. 
A high leverage firm will force the company to reduce its expenditures. The increment in salaries 
and fringe benefits are included in these expenditures. The firm has to pay interests on its debt 
liabilities and the redemption of liabilities will also affect the liquidity of the company. It is 
obvious that to manage the financial resources, a firm has to scarify its liberty to increase the 
expenditure on payments of fringe benefits to the directors of top level management. Therefore, a 
negative correlation may be assumed between the governance practices and leverage ratio of a 
firm. 
 
6.1.4 Corollary 4 
High amount of current assets lead to higher expenditures on top management.  
The higher proportionate of current assets in the total assets of a company will lead to more 
liberty to the directors and top level management to increase their salaries and other benefits. If 
large part of the capital is invested in the form of fixes assets, it will restrict the liberty to 
increase in the expenses on salaries and benefits. Higher magnitude of current ratio can be 
transformed into cash either by recovering of receivables or sale of inventories. 
 
6.2 Proposition 2 
 Good corporate governance leads to better liquidity management in a firm.  
Circularity debt (CD) is the proxy of liquidity 
LOGSALESTCAPEXPTNASCFTNASTLOGLTDCGCD 543210        [2]  
By incorporating model 1 into it, we have;          
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While CG is the predicted values of corporate governance taken from model 1 
Where   and β are the parameters         
Followings are the corollaries of the proposition 2 
 
 
 
  
6.2.1 Corollary 1 
Circularity debt problem can be mitigated by good corporate governance practices. It will lead 
them to take decisions, for instance leverage, which is aligning with all the shareholders of the 
firm. 
 
6.2.2 Corollary 2 
Decisions of board of directors like investment in fixed assets, management of cash flow and 
growth in sales are very much related to liquidity management. 
 
6.3 Proposition 3 
 Better liquidity management leads to retention decisions (LOGRE) by the managers. 
ROECDLOGRE 210               [3] 
 CD is the predicted values of circularity debt taken from model 2. By incorporating model 2 into 
it, we have;             
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So we have 
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Let 010 C  = C1 
Because this is constant or intercept of the model 
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Where   is the parameter 
Therefore, retained earning is an exponential function to measure. 
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Followings corollaries have been established based on above derivation. 
6.3.1 Corollary 1 
Corporate savings will be a function of good liquidity management and equity earnings. 
 
 
 
  
6.3.2 Corollary 2 
Firm specific variables will escort the corporations to make decisions which can reduce the 
agency conflicts. 
 
6.4 Proposition 4 
 A higher level of corporate savings will lead to higher investment in the country.  
Total investment in the country is Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) and corporate savings 
is retained earnings (LOGRE) by corporations.  
LOGREGCF 10                [4]
 
Where  is the parameter  
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That’s why 
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6.4.1 Corollary 1 
Development in terms of macro level investment in a country depends on retained earnings by 
corporate sector. 
 
6.4.2 Corollary 2 
Firms with good corporate governance practices will lead in the macroeconomic development in 
a country. 
 
7. Basic Assumptions of the Model 
1. There are only two types of firms i.e. public limited and private limited. 
2. Investment of retained earnings must be utilized in either merchandise inventory and/or 
fixed assets. 
3. Good corporate governance practices in necessary to achieve the objective of firms. 
4. All firms in the market are levered. 
 
8. Theoretical Model Of The Dissertation 
 
As discussed above, the ultimate objective of the thesis is to systematically prove the 
dependency of total investment in the country on corporate savings. The responsibility of social 
as well as economic development has now been partially shifted from government to private 
sector. It is, therefore, imperative to recognize the importance of corporations in order to attract 
more investment in the country. The theorem starts from the premise that corporate governance, 
as one of the offshoots of the economic governance can be explained by firm specific as well as 
  
some exogenous variables. Any change in any of the exogenous explanatory variable will 
automatically change the corporate governance settings, and hence economic governance. 
The second part explains the causes of circularity debt which results the liquidity problem among 
firms. These causes are exogenous variables along with the predicted values of corporate 
governance taken from the first model. It is hypothesized here that corporate governance can 
mitigate the problem of rising circularity debt exist in the economy. 
The third part attempts to examine that retained earnings by corporations is a function of equity 
earnings and the predicted values of liquidity taken from the second model. It must be kept in 
mind here that predicted values of liquidity also include predicted values of corporate 
governance. Therefore, it must be interpreted within the context of corporate governance. 
Finally, corporate savings is assumed to be a predictor of total investment of the country. Since 
all part of the model is interlinked with each other, corporate savings cannot be viewed 
separately. It is systematically deduced through a derivation sated in propositions. 
 
9. Data and Variables 
 
This research is aimed at studying and exploring the dependency of investment in a country on 
the corporate savings through a theorem. This is systematically examined through a derivation of 
four interlinked theoretical models. In order to achieve these objectives, secondary data was 
collected through audited annual accounts of sampled companies. In order to separate 
government-owned firms from IPPs, firms with more than 60% shares are assumed to be 
government owned.  Data of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) as the proxy of total 
investment in the country was collected from various issues of the economic survey of Pakistan. 
Data collected from these sources was then analyzed and interpret with the support of literature. 
There is much literature available, explaining the phenomenon of governance. Most of them 
were studied in the context of developed economies. Very little efforts were made to explore the 
area in developing or third world countries. This research is a value addition in the literature of 
economic governance particularly in Pakistan as the circularity debt issue only exists in Pakistan.  
 
10. Estimation Techniques 
 
There are four integrated theoretical models. Corporate governance which is endogenous 
variable in first model becomes exogenous in the second model. Similarly, liquidity which is 
endogenous variable in the second model becomes exogenous in the third model. Because of the 
nature of the models, 3-stage least square regression is appropriate to explain the phenomenon. 
The model is non-recursive as there are some reciprocal paths between models. In such cases, 
single equation estimation techniques like 2SLS may not provide an efficient estimate as 3SLS 
(Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Luthepohl and Lee 1985).  
 
11. Results And Analysis 
 
11.1 Descriptive nature of the data 
Table 8 depicts the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Analysis includes 
mean and standard deviation of all variables used in the theorem.  It shows that ownership 
concentration (OWNCON) and capital (LOGCAP) have same mean score while corporate assets 
  
(CA/FA) has a mean value more than of all variables with different standard deviations. 
Ownership concentration is the number of shares held by directors and capital means long term 
debt plus equity. Since both variables do not have same unit of analysis, no proper explanation 
can be justified. Corporate assets (CA/FA) have a mean value of 99.4167 with the standard 
deviation of 12.45824. The mean value of this variable indicates that this ratio reaches almost 
100% which shows heavy investments by firms in the form of liquid assets like cash or 
marketable securities. The type of organization (TORG) is a dummy variable which has a value 
of either 0 or 1, hence cannot be compared with rest of other variables. Examination of table 8 
also reveals some interesting facts. Mean score of long term debt (LOGLTD) and sales 
(LOGSALES) are more or less same. This result may be interpreted that long term debt of 
companies in the energy sector of Pakistan is, on average, near to total sales of the sector. This 
situation is supportive of the problem of circularity debt. As the credit sales increase, it becomes 
difficult to recover from the customers. To avoid the situation of lower cash inflows, companies 
in the payment chain starts borrowing from banks and increase the debt. If all of the cash flows, 
generated through sales, are used to pay off the long term debt, companies will be unable to meet 
its short term obligations, resulting inefficient operations. Mean value of cash flow to noncash 
asset (CFTNA) is 11.425 while capital expenditure to net asset is 146.962. 
Mean of retained earnings and return on equity are far from each other. Mean value of ROE 
(34.1135) is six times more of the mean of LOGRE (5.9146). It may be assumed that 
corporations have a possibility to increase the retained earnings while setting the dividend policy 
in line with the companies’ objective. Available growth opportunities can be availed only if a 
firm has sufficient cash management. Retained earning is the economical option to opt any new 
project by a firm. Profitability can be an objective of an investor who is present in the market for 
a very short span of time. Rational investors always look for far future in terms of the 
sustainability of the firm. A firm can be sustained in the market if it also depends on its earnings 
rather than sources outside the firm. 
 
11.2 Determination of Corporate Governance 
Table 9 illustrates the regression results of proposition 1. As discussed, type of organization is 
introduced as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 in case of government-owned listed firms 
and 0 for private-owned listed firms. The results in table 9 show that in the absence of private-
owned listed firms, there is positive and significant relationship with the corporate governance 
proxy. It reveals that directors in the government-owned listed firms get benefit by increasing 
their salary and other perquisites while this is not in case of private-owned listed firms. This 
evidence is supportive of the general arguments prevailed in the market and among institutional 
as well as individual investors. This depicts the bad corporate governance practices being 
practiced in government-owned firms. This is also one of the reasons as to why this sector is not 
helping common people in the form of providing proper electricity in the country. 
Ownership concentration has a negative impact on corporate governance practices of firms. 
Corporations with concentrated ownership allow directors to get maximum benefit from the firm. 
Their salary and other perquisites are increased for nothing. If some controlling shareholders are 
dominant in the firm, they will enjoy this opportunity to be benefited from this option.  
Capital also has negative and significant impact on corporate governance state of the company. 
As the capital increases, the ratio of salary and other perquisites of directors will be in a 
declining position and vice versa. Capital may be enhanced by increasing the debt or by issuing 
  
shares and raising the capital. Debt increase will also enhance the fixed costs of the company and 
can lead to bankruptcy position in future. It also strikes investors to start demanding higher 
equity return in the market. Share issue has an initial costs but feasible to most of the investors. It 
is, therefore, difficult to explain that this negative relationship is due to debt or equity level in the 
capital. 
Investment decisions show the strategic direction of a firm. Larger investment in liquid assets 
restricts the firm to get benefit from growth opportunities exist in the market. Moreover, liquid 
assets also include cash balance which may be used to undertake any project without going into 
the market, hence no more monitoring by outside investors are needed. The result reveals that 
firms heavily invest in current assets as compared to fixed assets. It may be deduced that 
directors use this money on their discretion. 
 
11.3 Reasons of Circularity Debt  
Since dependent variable in the proposition II is dichotomous, we applied logistic regression. 
Circularity debt is taken as a proxy of liquidity problem exists in public listed firms of Pakistan. 
It takes the value of 1 if any company faces this phenomenon and 0 otherwise. Table 9 presents 
the results of logistic regression. 
As expected, the negative sign of the corporate governance shows the acceptance of our 
hypothesis that circularity debt exists because of bad corporate governance in the energy sector 
of Pakistan. As discussed that the figures of circularity debt are the accounting treatment of 
receivables and payables.  Since table 3shows positive difference, it is evidenced that this 
problem is not because of financial management but of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance (PREDCG) is the predicted values taken from model 1 which means that it is itself 
the function of some exogenous variables. In other words, variables which explain the 
phenomenon of corporate governance is badly managed which causes the increase in circularity 
debt.  
It is Interesting to note that an increase in long term debt is linearly related to the problem of 
circularity debt. Debt is used to finance any new project which is supposed to generate positive 
net present value in order to maximize shareholders’ wealth. If LTD is used for this purpose, 
then there is economic significance of this result. This result does not follow either pecking order 
or free cash flow theory. The evidence of trade-off theory with respect to leverage is unknown. 
Cash flow to noncash assets is also significantly positive which means circularity debt tends to 
increase with cash flows. This is consistent with the pecking order theory which implies that 
when cash flows are high, corporations use this cash to finance new projects, settle their 
liabilities, pay dividends and finally accumulate cash to manage working capital requirements. 
When we look at the result of capital expenditure to noncash assets (CAPEXTNAST), it is 
significantly negative, showing evidence that firms with high cash flows invest in fixed assets 
which cause to accumulate the amount of circularity debt. The remaining cash is kept a side for 
day to day activity. Results show that an increase in sales also helps circularity debt to pile up. 
Since all sales are made on credit, we assume this result is as per our expectations. These credit 
sales are not converted into cash in near future, the amount of circularity debt increases. In other 
words, this result is following the pecking order as well as free cash flow theory. We can 
conclude this result by combining all variables into consideration. Companies make credit sales 
and somehow generate operating cash flows to fulfill the working capital requirements. Since 
  
this cash is not enough to finance new profitable projects, due to increase in receivables, they 
have to take long term loans.  
 
11.4 Determinants of Corporate Savings 
Table 9 shows that both of the predictors positively and significantly explain the variation in 
corporate savings. Overall model is significant and explaining 56.10% variation. Liquidity is the 
predicted value taken from model 2 which is itself a function of some exogenous variables. The 
magnitude of ROE is greater than the magnitude of liquidity. 
 
11.5 Corporate Savings as predictor of Total Investment in a Country 
The study of economic variables requires deep understanding of their various roots in order to 
appropriately justify. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a proxy of total investment in a 
country has different linkages when relate with the corporate sector. Second problem is 
determining the suitable time lag between dependent and explanatory variables. This thesis has a 
basic premise that corporate savings are a good predictor of total investment in a country in form 
of GFCF. As a result of increasing retained earnings by corporations, the country may face a 
rapid growth in terms of investments. It is a strategic decision by firms to decide about retained 
earnings and requires the approval of Board of directors (BoD). The time lag between the 
approval of BoD and actual capital expenditure is a crucial problem. Lund and Holden (1968) 
discussed the total lag pertaining to a particular investment in fixed assets by a firm consist of a 
fixed and a distributed component and it becomes further complicated when looking at an 
aggregate level like industry or the whole economy. He proposed a capital stock adjustment 
model and found satisfactory to explain the private gross fixed capital formation in the UK 
during 1923 to 1938. Companies in various industries respond to a situation with different lags 
based on time-varying cash flows, risk involved in that particular capital expenditure, time lapses 
between capital expenditure today and benefits to be anticipated in future and the like. Firms in 
the same industry respond differently in term of dividend announcement and retained earnings. 
Since mechanism of every industry is different, it is hard to decide which tame lag is an 
appropriate one. The nature of both of the variables in the last proposition is time series which 
have different implications at each time lag. It is assumed that investment in fixed assets by 
corporations will be a part of total investment of a country in the next year. Corporate savings are 
assumed to have one lag to explain the variation in GFCF of Pakistan.  
 
11.6 Rational behind the Notion   
The responsibility of social welfare has been partially shifted from government to private sector 
of the economy worldwide. A corporation is meant an institution which must fulfill, at least, the 
basic needs of common people. Although government is accountable to do the same, with the 
development of economy it is assumed that this job is done by corporate sector as well. 
Corporation is a nexus of different contracts with the society associated with it (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). It is not simply a firm to make profit but also an institution to have a 
responsibility of social wellbeing of common people. An investment decision by a corporation is 
taken as a strategic direction which may lead the firm to outperform in the market. As a result of 
this decision, several changes can be observed in the society which can be traced from several 
perspectives. This whole process can also be depicted by figure 4 below. The two side arrows 
show that both of the parties in the process will get benefit. 
  
11.7 Descriptive nature of the data 
We start the empirical part of by explaining the descriptive part of the data in table 10. At lag 1, 
both of the variables have far reach mean scores. When taking second lag of retained earnings, 
the mean values of both of the variables come to nearest of each other. It shows that any 
investment by corporations will be part of the investment of the country after one and two years. 
Later results are much supportive as compared to earlier one. 
 
11.8 Exploring the role of Corporate Savings 
Today, energy sector of Pakistan needs more attention in terms of investments in electricity 
plants, water dams and new technologies to generate more electricity in the country. These 
investment decisions by corporations in this sector can also boost up total investment in the 
country in the form of GFCF. Corporations can only take these decisions when they have 
sufficient available cash. Therefore, it may be deduced here that corporate savings are an 
important strategic decisions to prosper the country. Table 11 shows this empirical result. 
This is also tested by taking the second lag of retained earnings but results are still supportive of 
this notion. This is given in table 12. Second lag of retained earnings make the results more 
strong as the magnitude of the coefficient becomes more significant as compared to first lag. It 
shows that the results of second lag are more pronounced than the results of first lag. 
 
12. CONCLUSION 
 
The present research is a blend of economic governance and development financing. It develops 
a theorem, identifying antecedent variables which can better expound the given phenomenon. It 
has now come into the fact that investment position in a country can be improved if corporate 
sector plays its rigorous role to convert its earnings into investment. It was deduced from the 
theorem which states that the state of corporate governance must be improved in order to 
minimize the circularity debt problem which is really a governance issue. Resolution of this issue 
will lead the corporate sector to raise their liquidity and profitability as well. Government must 
focus on the issue of circularity debt from the governance point of view rather from the 
perspective of finance. Government is responsible to create a business environment where 
transparent management of public finance becomes possible at the national level. In case the 
government regulation is not efficient, rules of conduct for the private sector are desired. 
Particularly, improving the corporate social responsibility and relevance of corporate governance 
are needed. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Receivables from DISCOs (Million Rs.) 
DISCOs 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 % Share 
PESCO* 26,809 32,902 41,282 51,360 26% 
HESCO* 18,856 25,454 33,344 44,237 22% 
QESCO 4,297 5,238 24,780 48,193 24% 
LESCO 10,957 15,968 17,081 23,080 12% 
GEPCO 3,585 5,322 5,631 5,912 3% 
FESCO 3,719 5,676 5,866 7,068 4% 
IESCO 2,287 2,286 2,762 2,703 1% 
MEPCO 7,252 10,505 11,900 14,638 7% 
Total 77,762 103,351 142,646 197,191 100% 
Source:  Monthly Economic Review Saturday, 29th November 2014 
*PESCO includes TESCO and HESCO includes SEPCO 
 
Table 2: Receivables of DISCOs from Provinces and AJK (Million Rs.) 
Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Punjab (481) (9) (381) 162 (7) 3,263 5,371 5,842 
KPK 239 398 652 254 601 1,144 19,427 19,792 
Balochistan 538 119 146 709 1,064 2,419 4,662 52,696 
Sindh 341 2,382 3,224 7,603 14,241 25,790 39,230 6,200 
AJ&K (50) 485 756 1,216 2,391 4,393 9,888 15,953 
Total 587 3,375 4,397 9,944 18,290 37,009 78,578 100,483 
Primary Source: PEPCO DISCOs Performance Statistics Report (FY 2005 – FY 2012) 
Secondary Source: USAID Report; The Causes and Impact of Circular Debt exist in Power Sector in Pakistan 2013 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Circularity Debt Receivables (Billion Rs.) 
Company Receivables Payables Net Position Change 
30-Apr-11 30-Apr-10 
PSO 149 98 51 30 21 
SSGCL 51 44 7 -1 8 
SNGPL 11 25 -13 -9 -5 
PEPCO 304 302 3 -40 42 
OGDCL 116 0 116 80 36 
PARCO 38 - 38 30 8 
KESC 68 40 28 -24 51 
GHPL 10 - 10 11 -1 
PPL 22 - 22 26 -4 
KW&SB 7 8 -1 0 -1 
Grand Total 775 517 259 104 155 
  
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 
Table 4: Financing of Top 50 Listed Manufacturing Companies 
Period Country Internal 
Finance Long 
Term 
External 
Finance 
Equity 
Average 
External 
Finance 
Long Term 
Debt 
Change in 
Internal 
Finance 
1980-87 Korea 12.8 40.3 45.4 7.6 
1980-86 Pakistan 58.3 12.3 16.1 -4.6 
1980-87 Jordan 5.8 84.1 16.4 -24.1 
1983-87 Thailand 17.3 Na Na 23.1 
1984-88 Mexico 17.1 76.0 2.9 14.9 
1980-88 India 36.1 11.0 45.6 -12.6 
1982-87 Turkey 18.1 60.5 15.5 13.2 
1983-87 Malaysia 42.4 31.4 2.1 -7.7 
1980-88 Zimbabwe 58.5 43.0 0.0 16.8 
Source: Singh and Hamid (1992), Table III. 10, p 43. 
 
Table 5: Investment as a percentage of GDP 
Year FDI as of GDP Domestic Investment 
(GFCF) 
1990-91 0.61 17.30 
1991-92 0.57 17.47 
1992-93 0.69 18.69 
1993-94 0.68 19.24 
1994-95 0.81 17.97 
1995-96 1.19 17.03 
1996-97 1.46 17.38 
1997-98 1.15 16.34 
1998-99 0.81 15.04 
1999-00 0.84 13.93 
2000-01 0.42 16.01 
2001-02 0.54 15.84 
2002-03 1.15 15.46 
2003-04 0.65 15.27 
2004-05 1.16 15.63 
2005-06 1.97 15.26 
2006-07 1.43 15.40 
2007-08 1.03 15.55 
Source: World Bank (2007) 
  
 
 
Table 6: List of Abbreviations of Variables 
S.NO.  Variable    Description 
1  CG     Corporate Governance 
2  ORGTYP    Type of the Organization 
3  OWNCONCT    Ownership Concentration 
4  LOGCAP    log of Capital 
5  CAFA     Current Assets divided by Fixed Assets 
6  CD     Circularity Debt 
7  LOGLTD    Log of Long Term Debt 
8  CFTNAST    Cash Flow to Net Assets 
9  CAPEXPTNAST   Capital Expenditure to Net Assets 
10  LOGSALES    Log of Sales 
11  LOGRE    Log of Retained Earnings 
12  ROE     Return on Equity 
            13 GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation as Macro 
Level Investment in a Country 
Table 7: Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Determinants  Independent 
Variables 
Determinants  
Corporate 
Governance 
 A Ratio of 
Salary  & Other 
Perquisites of 
Management to 
Capital 
 Type of the 
organization 
 Ownership 
Concentration 
 Capital 
 Distribution of 
Assets 
 Government or 
Non-government  
 Percentage of  
shares held by 
directors 
 LTD+Equity 
 Current Asset / 
Fixed Assets 
Liquidity  
 Circularity Debt  
1= circularity 
debt exist 0= 
otherwise  
 Corporate 
Governance 
 LTD 
 Cash Generated 
during the year 
 Corporate 
Assets 
 
 Sales  
 From Model 1 
 
 Long Term Debt 
 Cash Flow to 
Noncash  Assets 
 Fixed Assets to 
Noncash  Assets 
 Log of  Sales 
Retention  
 Retained 
Earnings  
 Liquidity  
 Earnings  
 From Model 2 
 ROE 
Macro Level 
Investment in 
the Country 
 Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
 Corporate 
Savings 
 Retained Earnings 
  
Table 8: Descriptive Analysis 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation No. of observations 
 
LOGCG -0.052466 0.5636108 167 
TORG 0.41 0.493 167 
OWNCON 7.42338 16.4881571 167 
LOGCAP 7.0515 0.68123 167 
PREDCG -0.0903 0.343 177 
LOGLTD 6.004 1.451 180 
LOGSALES 7.350 0.961 182 
LOGRE 5.9146 0.915 114 
PREDLIQ 0.266181 0.336 114 
ROE 34.1135 26.512 114 
 
Table 9: Results 
Proposition 1 Proposition 2 Proposition 3 
Variables 
Coefficie
nt 
Std. 
Erro
r 
Variables 
Coefficie
nt 
Std. 
Erro
r 
Variables 
Coefficie
nt 
Std. 
Erro
r 
Intercept -0.462 0.584 Intercept -45.893 8.291 Intercept 4.964 
(50.865 
0.09
8 
TORG 0.175* 
(1.941) 
0.090 PREDCG -2.547* 1.294 PREDLIQ 1.051* 
(6.044) 
0.17
4 
OWNCO
N 
-0.012* 
(-4.744) 
0.003 LOGLTD 1.845* 0.464 ROE 0.020* 
(8.924) 
0.00
2 
LOGCAP -0.148* 
(-2.200) 
0.067 
 
CFTNAST 0.041* 0.016 
 
No. of 
Obs. 
113  
CA/FA 0.015* 
(4.868) 
0.003 CAPEXTNA
ST 
-0.014* 0.008    
   LOGSALES 4.201* 0.952    
Adjusted R2 0.276     Adjusted R2 0.561  
F Statistics 16.837     F Statistics 73.124  
* Significant at the 5 percent levels 
t statistics are in parenthesis 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Analysis 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Variables Mean Std.Dev. 
GFCF 5.65700 6.8923300 GFCF 5.81200 6.9289000 
REt-1 1.00300 2.4724500 REt-2 7.607600 2.0276500 
 
 
  
Table 11: Predicting the GFCF 
Variables 
Model 
Coefficie
nt 
Std. 
Error 
Intercept 3.89100 
(3.981) 
9.77300 
REt-1 17.601 
(4.748) 
3.707 
 R2 0.399  
F Statistics 22.541  
* Significant at the 5 percent levels 
t statistics are in parenthesis . 
 
Table 12: Predicting the GFCF 
Variables 
Model 
Coefficie
nt 
Std. 
Error 
Intercept 4.21900 
(14.197) 
1.00500 
REt-2 20.942 
(4.455) 
4.701 
 R2 0.357  
F Statistics 19.849  
* Significant at the 5 percent levels 
t statistics are in parenthesis . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1 Investment as Percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Gross Fixed Capital Formation History in Pakistan 
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 Figure 3 An Econometric Model of Corporate Governance and Circularity Debt 
  
 
Figure 4 Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts 
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